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ETHICS PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS
Proof. The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he
endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he
endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV. xxxvii.), and,
consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note ii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore the
free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.
Note. These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true freedom, may be referred to
strength, that is, to courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it worth while to prove
separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry
with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.
These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii.
and xlvi.; namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for others the
good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV. l., and in
other places; namely, that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the
necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever,
accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his own
disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to
conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger,
envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as we said
before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of
attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part.
APPENDIX.
WHAT I have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged, so as to admit of being
seen at one view, but has been set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most
readily be deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
under leading heads.
I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot be
adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.
II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can be understood through it alone, are
those which are referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the
remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force
and increase are generally defined not by the power of man, but by the us: wherefore the former are rightly
called actions, the latter passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand,
show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest
may be either good or bad.
IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in
this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing else but the
contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is
nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of his
nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to
govern all his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things
within the scope of his intelligence.
APPENDIX. 28
ETHICS PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS
V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man
in his enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things
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