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discovered many of her laws, and have very happily applied them
to account for many phenomena; but they have never discovered the
3
On Locke, see my John Locke s Epistemological Piety: Reason is the Candle of the
Lord, Faith and Philosophy, 11, No. 4 (Oct. 1994): 572 91).
258 Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology
efficient cause of any one phenomenon; nor do those who have distinct
notions of the principles of the science, make any such pretense.
Upon the theatre of nature we see innumerable effects, which require
an agent endowed with active power; but the agent is behind the scene.
Whether it be the Supreme Cause alone, or a subordinate cause or
causes; and if subordinate causes be employed by the Almighty, what
their nature, their number, and their different offices may be are things
hid, for wise reasons without doubt, from the human eye.
It is only in human actions, that may be imputed for praise or blame,
that it is necessary for us to know who is the agent; and in this, nature
has given us all the light that is necessary for our conduct. (EAP I, vi
[527a b])
It remains the case, nonetheless, that the discovery by natural
science of nomological explanations is an important achieve-
ment; it gives considerable satisfaction to our avidity to know the
causes of things.
What must now be brought into the picture, however, is a
theme that has run throughout our discussion in the preceding
chapters: The philosopher s attempt to offer nomological ex-
planations of the workings of the human mind is constantly
frustrated, and is almost certain to be frustrated forever. We
perceive those workings well enough to discern certain laws
of nature. Though we have not yet attained a precise formulation
of those laws, Reid thought there could be no doubt that per-
ception, for example, does occur in accord with laws of nature
and that we have a good grasp of the basic form of those laws. Yet
at the points where we would most like explanation, we have
none. We have no explanation of why brain events evoke the sen-
sations that they do evoke, nor any of why sensations evoke the
apprehensions and beliefs of external objects that they evoke.4
Worse yet, we have no explanation of why brain events evoke any
sensations at all, nor of why sensations evoke any apprehensions
and beliefs of external objects. The perception of external
objects is one main link of that mysterious chain, which connects
the material world with the intellectual. . . . many things in this
operation [are] unaccountable; sufficient to convince us, that we
know but little of our own frame; and that a perfect comprehen-
sion of our mental powers, and of the manner of their operation,
4
There is a deep and dark gulf between [impressions upon the body and sensations of
the mind], which our understanding cannot pass (IHM VI, xxi [187a; B 176]).
Conclusion 259
is beyond the reach of our understanding (EIP II, i [245b]).5
The philosopher can discover certain abstract and necessary rela-
tions of things ; but as to his knowledge of what really exists, he
is led to it in the dark, and knows not how he came by it (EIP II,
xx [330a]).
Some will interpret this shortfall of knowledge as marking out
an area in which science has more discoveries to make. Reid
demurs. Nomological explanations appeal to the natures, the con-
stitutions, of things. Nomological explanations at this point would
have to discover something about the nature of the brain, and
about the nature of the mind, such that those together account
for the fact that brain events evoke the sensations they do. It
appears to Reid, however, that the constitution of brain and mind
are such that, constitution remaining the same, the laws of oper-
ation might very well be different from what they are. Pressure
on the skin might produce visual sensations, and so forth. If Reid
is right about this, then no nomological explanation of the fun-
damental functions of the mind, and of its relation to the brain,
is possible.
So darkness here too; and this darkness is likewise impenetra-
ble. When we have discovered the laws in accord with which per-
ception occurs, we find ourselves incapable of moving beyond
those discoveries to offer nomological explanations of these work-
ings. In fact it seems likely that there are no such explanations
to be discovered. The laws we do have in hand are not to be
explained, other than that they are the rules in accord with which
the efficient agents operating in nature do their work. This brings
us back to the earlier point: We don t know what those agents are,
nor how they do their work, other than that the ultimate agent is
God.
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