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The products also exceed the state of the art of new designs in the
destination country, as of the time of shipment.
CTC Invoice Number: 21089
Manufacturer: Data General Corporation
So confident are the Soviets that our strategic goods embargo is a leaky sieve that they not
only import illegal military end use equipment, but ship it back to the West for repair,
presumably secure in the belief that it can be reimported.
One example that was intercepted occurred in July 1977 when California Technology
Corporation placed a purchase order with a U.S. manufacturer for $66,000 in components
for sophisticated electronic machinery with direct military application. All components
ordered were Munitions List items and cannot be legally exported without approval from
the U.S. Department of State. Yet CTC received the equipment and in September 1977,
under the name Interroga International Components and Sales Organization, CTC exported
the components to West Germany.
Three years later one of the components was in need of repair. It was sent to the
manfuacturer's plant for work. On June 16 and 23, 1981, in West Germany, Stephen Dodge
of Customs, Robert Rice of Commerce, and Theodore W. Wu, Assistant U.S. Attorney in
Los Angeles, received information that the machinery had been sold originally to
Mashpriborintorg of Moscow, and the Russians had sent the disabled component back to
ADT of Dusseldorf for repair.
A telex from CTC executives in Dusseldorf to Anatoli Maluta in Los Angeles, dated
February 27, 1980, was seized by U.S. Customs agents. The telex said the component
would be returned to the U.S. for repair. A "friend" would receive the repaired equipment
and then turn it over to Maluta for re-export.
Now let's turn to the question of how the Soviets know what to order for their
semiconductor plant. The invoices reproduced above suggest the Soviets knew precisely
what production equipment they wanted to build a semiconductor plant. The question is
how did they find out the model numbers, specifications and the rest?
Footnotes:
14
United States Senate, Transfer of United States High Technology to the
Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations Hearings before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, 97th Congress Second Session, May 1982,
Washington, D.C., p.
15
United States Senate, Transfer of United States High Technology to the
Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations Hearings before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, 97th Congress Second Session, May 1982,
Washington, D.C., p. 259.
16
United States Senate, Transfer of United States High Technology to the
Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations Hearings before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, 97th Congress Second Session, May 1982,
Washington, D.C., p. 29.
BACK
CHAPTER V
Computers - Deception by Control Data Corporation
"We have offered to the Socialist countries only standard commercial
computers and these offerings have been in full compliance with the export
control and administrative directives of the Department of Commerce."
William C. Norris, Chairman Control Data Corporation
To make any progress in developing weapons systems the Soviets must utilize modern
high-speed computers. The computers and the necessary computer technology, both
hardware and software, have come from the West, almost exclusively from the United
States.
At the end of the 1950s the United States had about 5,000 computers in use, while the
Soviet Union had only about 120. These Soviet computers, as reported by well-qualified
observers, were technically well behind those of the West and barely out of the first-
generation stage even as late as the 1960s.
In the late fifties the Soviets produced about thirty to forty BESM-type computers for
research and development work on atomic energy and rockets and missiles. In general, the
BESM type has most of the features typical of early U.S. computers. The original version
had 7,000 tubes; the later version had 3,000 tubes and germanium diodes.
The only Soviet computer in continuous production in the 1960s was the URAL-I, followed
by the URAL-II and URAL-IV modifications of the original model. The URAL-I has an
average speed of 100 operations per second, compared to 2,500 operations per second on
U.S. World War II machines and 15,000 operations per second for large U.S. machines of
the 1950s, and 1-10 million operations per second common in the early 1970s. Occupying
40 square meters of floor space, URAL-I contains 800 tubes and 3,000 germanium diodes;
its storage units include a magnetic drum of 1,024 cells and a magnetic tape of up to 40,000
cells considerably less than U.S. machines of the 1960s. URAL-II and URAL-IV
incorporate slightly improved characteristics. The URAL series is based on U.S.
technology.
Production methods for both the URAL and the BESM computers were the same as
American methods.
Until the mid-1960s direct import of computers from the United States was heavily
restricted by export control regulations. In 1965 only $5,000 worth of electronic computers
and parts were shipped from the United States to the Soviet Union, and only $2,000 worth
in 1966. This changed in 1967. Computer exports increased to $1,079,000 and a higher rate
of export of U.S. electronic computers to the USSR has been maintained to the present time
under constant lobbying pressure from U.S. businessmen and their trade associations.
The precise amount and nature of U.S. computer sales to the Soviet Union since World War
II is censored, but it is known that after World War II, IBM sales to the Communist world
came "almost entirely from [IBM's] Western European plants," partly because of U.S.
export control restrictions and partly because U.S. equipment operates on 60 cycles,
whereas Russian and European equipment operates on 50 cycles.
American computer sales as opposed to Soviet theft may be traced from 1959 with sale of a
Model-802 National-Elliott sold by Elliott Automation, Ltd., of the United Kingdom.
(Elliott Automation is a subsidiary of General Electric in the United States.) Towards the
end of the sixties Soviet purchases of computers were stepped up, and by late i969 it was
estimated that Western computer sales to all of Communist Europe, including the USSR,
were running at $40 million annually, in great part from European subsidiaries of American
companies. In 1964-65 Elliott Automation delia ;red five Model-503 computers to the
USSR, including one for installation in the Moscow Academy of Sciences. Other General
Electric made in Europe machines, for example, a Model-400 made in France by
Compagnie des Machines Bull, were also sold to the USSR.
Olivetti-General Electric of Milan, Italy has been a major supplier of GE computers in the
USSR. In I967 the Olivetti firm delivered $2.4 million worth of data-processing equipment
systems to the USSR in addition to Model-400 and Model-115 machines.
In sum, General Electric from 1959 onwards sold to the Soviet Union through its European
subsidiaries a range of its medium-capacity computers.
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