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prepared and arranged for a great movement. The decision in such cases resembles the effect of a mine well
closed and tamped, whilst an event in itself perhaps just as great, in a state of rest, is more or less like a mass
of powder puffed away in the open air.
At the same time, as a matter of course, the state of tension must be imagined in different degrees of intensity,
and it may therefore approach gradually by many steps towards the state of rest, so that at the last there is a
very slight difference between them.
Now the real use which we derive from these reflections is the conclusion that every measure which is taken
during a state of tension is more important and more prolific in results than the same measure could be in a
state of equilibrium, and that this importance increases immensely in the highest degrees of tension.
The cannonade of Valmy, September 20, 1792, decided more than the battle of Hochkirch, October 14, 1758.
In a tract of country which the enemy abandons to us because he cannot defend it, we can settle ourselves
differently from what we should do if the retreat of the enemy was only made with the view to a decision
under more favourable circumstances. Again, a strategic attack in course of execution, a faulty position, a
single false march, may be decisive in its consequence; whilst in a state of equilibrium such errors must be of
a very glaring kind, even to excite the activity of the enemy in a general way.
Most bygone Wars, as we have already said, consisted, so far as regards the greater part of the time, in this
state of equilibrium, or at least in such short tensions with long intervals between them, and weak in their
effects, that the events to which they gave rise were seldom great successes, often they were theatrical
exhibitions, got up in honour of a royal birthday (Hochkirch), often a mere satisfying of the honour of the
arms (Kunersdorf), or the personal vanity of the commander (Freiberg).
That a Commander should thoroughly understand these states, that he should have the tact to act in the spirit
of them, we hold to be a great requisite, and we have had experience in the campaign of 1806 how far it is
sometimes wanting. In that tremendous tension, when everything pressed on towards a supreme decision, and
that alone with all its consequences should have occupied the whole soul of the Commander, measures were
proposed and even partly carried out (such as the reconnaissance towards Franconia), which at the most
might have given a kind of gentle play of oscillation within a state of equilibrium. Over these blundering
schemes and views, absorbing the activity of the Army, the really necessary means, which could alone save,
were lost sight of.
But this speculative distinction which we have made is also necessary for our further progress in the
construction of our theory, because all that we have to say on the relation of attack and defence, and on the
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completion of this double-sided act, concerns the state of the crisis in which the forces are placed during the
tension and motion, and because all the activity which can take place during the condition of equilibrium can
only be regarded and treated as a corollary; for that crisis is the real War and this state of equilibrium only its
reflection.
BOOK IV. THE COMBAT
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY
HAVING in the foregoing book examined the subjects which may be regarded as the efficient elements of
War, we shall now turn our attention to the combat as the real activity in Warfare, which, by its physical and
moral effects, embraces sometimes more simply, sometimes in a more complex manner, the object of the
whole campaign. In this activity and in its effects these elements must therefore, reappear.
The formation of the combat is tactical in its nature; we only glance at it here in a general way in order to get
acquainted with it in its aspect as a whole. In practice the minor or more immediate objects give every
combat a characteristic form; these minor objects we shall not discuss until hereafter. But these peculiarities
are in comparison to the general characteristics of a combat mostly only insignificant, so that most combats
are very like one another, and, therefore, in order to avoid repeating that which is general at every stage, we
are compelled to look into it here, before taking up the subject of its more special application.
In the first place, therefore, we shall give in the next chapter, in a few words, the characteristics of the
modern battle in its tactical course, because that lies at the foundation of our conceptions of what the battle
really is.
CHAPTER II. CHARACTER OF THE MODERN BATTLE
ACCORDING to the notion we have formed of tactics and strategy, it follows, as a matter of course, that if
the nature of the former is changed, that change must have an influence on the latter. If tactical facts in one
case are entirely different from those in another, then the strategic, must be so also, if they are to continue
consistent and reasonable. It is therefore important to characterise a general action in its modern form before
we advance with the study of its employment in strategy.
What do we do now usually in a great battle? We place ourselves quietly in great masses arranged contiguous
to and behind one another. We deploy relatively only a small portion of the whole, and let it wring itself out
in a fire-combat which lasts for several hours, only interrupted now and again, and removed hither and
thither by separate small shocks from charges with the bayonet and cavalry attacks. When this line has
gradually exhausted part of its warlike ardour in this manner and there remains nothing more than the cinders,
it is withdrawn[*] and replaced by another.
[*] The relief of the fighting line played a great part in the battles of the Smooth-Bore era; it was necessitated
by the fouling of the muskets, physical fatigue of the men and consumption of ammunition, and was
recognised as both necessary and advisable by Napoleon himself.--EDITOR.
In this manner the battle on a modified principle burns slowly away like wet powder, and if the veil of night
commands it to stop, because neither party can any longer see, and neither chooses to run the risk of blind
chance, then an account is taken by each side respectively of the masses remaining, which can be called still
effective, that is, which have not yet quite collapsed like extinct volcanoes; account is taken of the ground
gained or lost, and of how stands the security of the rear; these results with the special impressions as to
bravery and cowardice, ability and stupidity, which are thought to have been observed in ourselves and in the
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enemy are collected into one single total impression, out of which there springs the resolution to quit the field
or to renew the combat on the morrow.
This description, which is not intended as a finished picture of a modern battle, but only to give its general
tone, suits for the offensive and defensive, and the special traits which are given, by the object proposed, the
country, may be introduced into it, without materially altering the conception.
But modern battles are not so by accident; they are so because the parties find themselves nearly on a level as
regards military organisation and the knowledge of the Art of War, and because the warlike element inflamed
by great national interests has broken through artificial limits and now flows in its natural channel. Under
these two conditions, battles will always preserve this character.
This general idea of the modern battle will be useful to us in the sequel in more places than one, if we want to
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