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special sense, and from which impulses come about. Of practical impulse there are several species . . . including prothesis, an
indication of accomplishment; epibole, an impulse before an impulse; paraskeue, an action before an action; encheiresis, an
impulse toward something already in hand; hairesis, a boulesis from reasoning by analogy; prohairesis, a hairesis before a
hairesis; boulesis, a reasonable desire (orexis ); thelesis, a voluntary boulesis . (Arius Didymus apud Stob. Ecl. 2. 86 88
Wachsmuth [= SVF 3. 169, 173, 171])[7]
From this unprepossessing passage several points emerge. One is that impulses are correlated with
"impulsory appearances"; here we should understand "impulsory" from impulse, not the other way round.
The impulsory appearances are just those that do in fact produce an impulse, and there is no interesting
independent categorization of these. The Stoics are not operating with a picture of the world in which all
facts about the world are inert, and so need the addition of some mysterious extra ingredient before action
can be produced in response to them. They accept the commonsense picture, namely, that some facts do,
on occasion, lead some people to act. There is no special mystery about these cases; this is just the kind of
fact that they are. Another is that the Stoics appear at least to have been consciously distancing themselves
from Aristotle's account of action; Aristotle's favored terms orexis and prohairesis appear in very trivial
roles. But if the Stoics were consciously distancing themselves, it was not a success; the terms reappeared
in Epictetus in something like Aristotle's usage.[8]
[7] See Inwood (1985) for detailed discussion of this passage and the numerous textual and interpretative
problems it presents.
[8] See Bonhoeffer (1890, 118 19, 232 61); Pohlenz (1970, 328 32); Inwood (1985, app. 2). Prohairesis
is Aristotle's term for deliberated choice; the Stoics give it less room because they downplay the role of
deliberation. Orexis is Aristotle's widest term for desire in general; the Stoics reject this (along with
Epicurus; see part 3, chapter 8), substituting the term horme, which did become established philosophical
usage. We cannot say with certainty whether the Stoics had
(footnote continued on the next page)
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Two highly important points emerge from the passage. On the one hand, there are many very different
kinds of impulse to action in particular, one only touched on here, but crucial to the Stoics, that between
desire for virtue (the only thing that is good) and desire for other things (which are worth having, but by
comparison with virtue, are "indifferent"). But, on the other hand, all these different kinds of motivations can
be given a single analysis, for they can all be explained as an impulse. This is a unifying analysis however
complex an intention, however tortured a decision, there is something in both which we can isolate as "the
impulse" but it is not reductive. We are finding a common form, not a lowest common denominator.[9]
How does reason, characteristic of human impulse, enter in? Diogenes talks of reason as "crafting"
impulse; Origen of its choosing between impulses.[10] Clement tells us that reason helps us to discriminate
among appearances and not be carried away by them.[11] Chrysippus with characteristic overstatement calls
impulse "a person's reason prescriptive of acting."[12] What holds these characterizations together?
It seems as though there is a certain parallelism between action and perception; in both cases there is
an appearance, and what is up to the rational agent is to accept or reject it. We find indeed that reason in
the action case functions in the form of assent.[13] Our best source tells us in more detail:
They say that all the impulses are assents, but that the practical ones contain the motive element. Actually, assents are to one
thing, and impulses toward another; as-
(footnote continued from the previous page)
Aristotle in mind; their theory is certainly more systematic than his fragmentary remarks on the "practical
syllogism" and had little to learn from those remarks.
[9] Compare the similarly nonreductive analysis of all kinds of desires in terms of "pro-attitudes" in the work
of Donald Davidson on action theory.
[10] In the long passage in part 2, chapter 2, section d.
[11] Strom. 2. 487 (= SVF 2. 714).
[12] Plut. De St. repugn. 1037f (= SVF 3. 175).
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[13] See Plut. De St. repugn. 1057a (= SVF 3. 177).
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sents are to statements (axiomata ) of a kind, and impulses are toward predicates (kategoremata ), those that are somehow
contained in the statements to which they assent. (Arius Didymus apud Stob. Ecl. 2. 88 Wachsmuth [= SVF 3. 171]).[14]
Thus to understand how an impulse can either be an assent or involve one, we first have to look at Stoic
predicates.
A predicate is not a bit of language, but something expressed in language; it is technically an
"incomplete sayable (lekton )," which can be completed in various ways to form what is expressed in
commands, prayers, and so on; and when combined with a subject term produces a statement (axioma ),
expressed in an utterance.[15] "A predicate is what is said of something; or an item which can go into a
construction with one or more subjects, as Apollodorus says, or an incomplete sayable [lekton ] which goes
into a construction with a subject term to produce a statement."[16] Predicates are obviously not to be
identified with words on the one hand or with items like properties on the other. There is no very intuitive
account of a Stoic predicate; to get the idea we do best to think of a complete lekton expressed in a
statement, and think of what remains when one removes the subject term, the referring element in it. When
talking about predicates the Stoics tend to use the standard form "to A," the infinitive form of the verb, a
form which shows incompleteness in that it cannot be used on its own to make a statement. When the
predicate is completed by a subject term to produce a complete lekton expressed in a statement, I shall say
that the predicate is satisfied.[17]
[14] This is a continuation of the long passage above.
[15] D. L. 7. 64 (= SVF 2. 183). See the discussion of types of statement at D. L. 7. 69 70 (= SVF 2. 204)
and Sext. Emp. Math. 8. 96 103 (partly in SVF 2. 205).
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